John Chrysostom spoke often about fear, not only in the wake of actual
situations of terror, such as the Riot of the Statues, when the populace
as a whole quaked in fear, but also in the course of his regular
preaching, when he deliberately evoked dread in his listeners by
conjuring imaginative scenarios of punishment. So useful was fear in his
estimation that the preacher openly wished that he could “always and
continually speak about Hell” (De Laz. 2.3, PG 48. 985). Such
unalloyed enthusiasm suggests a strongly disciplinary agenda, and we
know that Chrysostom was indeed focused on the moral reformation of his
listeners. Fear was a useful ally not only in restraining his listeners
from immoral tendencies but also in spurring them to ethical actions.
But fear, as Aristotle noted, is a complex emotion and Chrysostom was,
among other things, a very astute observer of human nature. This paper
argues, accordingly, that Chrysostom’s appreciation of fear springs not
only from its disciplinary utility but also from its capacity to enhance
group solidarity and, perhaps most signally, to promote a deliberate
state in which values are reassessed and temporal frames clarified.
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