Showing posts with label Maximus. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Maximus. Show all posts

Sunday, 3 May 2015

Smilen Markov: Maximus’ Concept of Will through the Interpretation of Damascene and Photius

In defending the Christological diophysitism Maximus develops a specific model of Christ’s human act of will by differentiating two levels of rational intentionality. On the first level the desired goal is set. The second level is the manifestation of the γνώμη: through the choice a certain way (τρόπος) of realizing the capacity of will is endorsed, according to the personal disposition of the hypostasis acting. In this sense there is no γνώμη in Christ. John Damascene adopts Maximus’ model, but uses different conceptual kits. He distinguishes two separate levels of the will power: θέλησις determines the objects of human rational appetite, whereas βούλησις supplies the process of decision-making with volitional support. This theoretical differentiation enables John to outline two vectors of the cognitive component of the act of will: a discursive and a non-discursive one. Here γνώμη has a much larger scope than a mere personal specification of will: it is an existential gesture. Photius adheres to Damascene’s view on γνώμη. He coins the term “personal will”, denoting the area, in which human will is qualified by its objects, as well as by other persons’ acts of will. Christ’s human will confirms his personal identity, by sharing it with creation and not by constructing it as an individual disposition. He possesses a personal human will, as he interacts with the acts of will of other human-beings, but he does not possess a γνώμη.

Friday, 1 May 2015

Dionysios Skliris: The Philosophical Implications of Maximus the Confessor’s Eschatology

As the last thinker of Late Antiquity, Maximus could be examined in relation to the past as a bold reformer of Aristotelianism. He could also be observed in relation to the future: Some innovative elements of his thought, such as his historical dialectic, entail a Christian transformation of the Platonic-Aristotelian legacy in the direction of its greater historization and interiorization. Maximus is thinking of the end (telos) just like Aristotle, as entailing a passage from potentiality (dynamis) to actualization (energeia). He also has a particularly Aristotelian sense of retroactive final causation, namely the fact that we can understand a being only from its end. He also uses a notion of “attraction” (helxis, cf. PG 90,1389A) that is causation and motion take place mainly through attraction and not through impulsion. But Maximus transforms the Aristotelian teleology radically by putting it in historical and eschatological terms. The field of passage from potentiality to actuality is not Biology or nature but History. And the end which attracts is not natural maturity but the eschaton which presents nevertheless a gap of radical discontinuity in relation to natural evolution. Eschatology at the same time confirms teleology and “crucifies” it. In our presentation, we shall try to examine how Maximus receives but also modifies Aristotelian teleology as well as the relation of his thought with the later development of dialectics. We shall also endeavour to develop the philosophical implications of his eschatology especially in what concerns the theory of being, motion, time and activity (energeia).

Wednesday, 29 April 2015

David Brandshaw: St. Maximus on Time, Eternity, and Divine Knowledge

There are a number of problems pertaining to the relationship between time, eternity, and divine knowledge.  First is the well-known problem of the compatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom.  Second is the question of whether God knows temporally indexed propositions, such as what time it is now or that a given event occurred yesterday.  Third is a problem regarding the apparent diminishment of divine action: if God knows from all eternity the entire history of any world He might create, then it would appear that He in fact performs only one action, that of choosing to create a particular world with its history.

The options available for addressing these problems depend upon one’s view of the nature of time and eternity.  Beginning with Dionysius the Areopagite, the Eastern Christian tradition developed a distinctive view on this topic.  For Dionysius, both time and eternity are divine “processions”—that is, acts that manifest God but are not equivalent to the divine essence.  Dionysius’s early commentator, John of Scythopolis, added to this an understanding of time as the “shining forth” of that which is latent or implicit within eternity.  Building upon these starting points, Maximus the Confessor developed a subtle view in which the logoi of time return to their original unity within divine eternity through the free acts of creatures.  This paper will explore the implications of this Dionysian-Maximian view for the problems stated above.

Wednesday, 1 April 2015

Torstein Theodor Tollefsen: WS 'Maximian Holomerism: Maximus the Confessor's Philosophy of Whole and Part'

Maximus’ metaphysics has two basic features, viz. a doctrine of logoi  that are the divine principles for the cosmic order of essences, and a doctrine of whole and part arrangements of the created world. Parts subsist in the wholes and the wholes in the parts, and in this way the whole system of particulars, species, and genera is interconnected with a view to the universal conversion in Christ of all being to God. This doctrine of whole and part arrangements has almost never been investigated before but still it is an obvious and important feature of Maximus’ ‘system’.

This paper is intended for the workshop arranged by Sotiris Mitralexis.

Wednesday, 13 July 2011

Han-luen Kantzer Komline - WORKSHOP Title: Via est qua imus: Perspectives on Augustine’s Christology PAPER Title: Augustine on the Two Wills of Christ


In a recent essay, Brian Daley has considered the evidence that Maximus the Confessor knew Augustine’s theology based on a number of foundational resonances between the thought of the two fathers (Daley, 2008).  These include the affirmation, by both Augustine and Maximus, of two distinct wills in Christ: a human will and a divine will.  Building on this observation, this paper considers Augustine’s insistence, in the early fifth century, on the idea that Christ had two distinct wills.  
Focusing on Augustine’s affirmation of this notion in his Enarratio of Psalm 93 and his treatise Contra sermonem Arianorum, the paper evaluates how Augustine articulates the idea of Christ’s two wills in each of these contexts and explores his possible motivations for developing the notion as he does in each case.  It considers, in other words, the role of Augustine’s affirmation of Christ’s two wills in the polemical contexts of the debates, late in his life, with Pelagianism and with the Homoian Arianism represented by Palladius of Ratiaria and the Arian bishop Maximinus.  
With respect to the latter case, this paper will show how Augustine posits two wills in Christ to secure a Christologically appropriate interpretation of a litany of scriptural quotations, cited by his “Arian” opponents, in which Jesus submits to the will of the Father.  Reading John 6:38 (“I came down from heaven, not to do my will, but to do the will of him who sent me”) through the lens of Romans 5:15-21, Augustine shows that the submission of Christ’s human will to the divine will signifies, not his lack of a fully divine nature, but rather his possession of a fully divine and human nature in one person.  In Augustine’s exegesis of John 6:39, the very possibility of Christ’s human will overcoming the natural human temptation to oppose God autonomously (his capacity to say “not my will) presupposes his possession of a fully divine nature and will.  Thus, in this exegetical-polemical context, Augustine’s affirmation of the two wills of Christ secures his affirmation of Christ’s possession of a divine substantia as well as a human substantia. 
The paper will conclude by contrasting how and why Augustine articulated the notion of Christ’s two wills in these two instances with the motivations and polemical concerns that led Maximus to strikingly similar conclusions in the seventh century.  

Despina Prassas - St. Maximus the Confessor's Quaestiones et dubia: Possible Rabbinic Sources


The interpretative style of Maximus the Confessor is something of a mixture of literal, allegorical, anagogical, tropological, and ascetical.  Yet, in the Quaestiones et dubia, to draw from Manlio Simonetti’s writing on biblical interpretation, the Confessor applies “scripture to the various circumstances of the community’s life . . . so as to adapt it to the needs and purposes with which it may not have had an immediate or obvious link.” In his interpretation of biblical and patristic texts, Maximus attempted to respond to questions that arose from the practical application of a text to the everyday life of the monastic community.  The ultimate goal was to educate his reader, where the word ‘educate’ could be understood in a variety of ways. Yet his scriptural interpretation was not entirely original.  Text studies have shown the similarities between Maximus’s interpretations and those of Origen, Evagrius and Didymus. Were there any other sources of his interpretations?   

During the first six hundred years of the Common Era, Jewish scholars used a variety of methods to comment on the understanding of the Hebrew Scriptures.  By 200 CE, these interpretations had been recorded into the Midrash, which is not only a collection of interpretations but a commentary on the process of the way in which the scholars at the time read scripture.   While the development of the middoh (primarily of Hillel and Eliezer) were highly influential in the way in which scripture would be interpreted, this paper will focus on the content of the interpretations, specifically those of Genesis and the similarities between the Genesis Rabbah and Maximus’s Quaestiones et dubia.  This paper will also address potential implications of this work  with regard to the question of the two vitae and the accessibility of rabbinic sources.  

Christopher Beeley - “'Let This Cup Pass from Me': The Soul of Christ in Origen and Maximus Confessor”



Jesus’ human soul plays a crucial role in the Christology of Origen, linking together Christ’s humanity and divinity and providing the centerpoint of Origen’s understanding of Christian salvation and biblical exegesis. Yet, paradoxically, Origen’s musings on the soul of Christ quickly became one of the most controversial aspects of his theological legacy, requiring later generations to make significant qualifications, modifications, or omissions to this aspect of Origen’s Christology. Nevertheless, despite these points of contention, a central regard for Jesus’ mental and emotional life remains a hallmark of the continuity of Origenist tradition among the Greek fathers of the fourth to eighth centuries, by contrast with other thinkers for whom Christ’s human soul plays relatively little role. 
This paper will compare Origen’s pathbreaking account of Christ’s human soul with that found in arguably the last great Origenist theologian of the patristic age, Maximus the Confessor. While noting the basic principles that Maximus drew from Gregory Nazianzen, we will concentrate on how, in Maximus’ work before and during the monothelite controversy, Christ’s human soul continues to play an equally central role in biblical interpretation, structural Christology, soteriology, Christian asceticism, and liturgy, even as it differs in some major respects with Origen’s approach to the same subjects. Attention will be given finally, to how Maximus’ Christology stands in relation to wider Chalcedonian and non-Chalcedonian traditions.

Johannes Börjesson - Maximus the Confessor’s Knowledge of Augustine: An Exploration of Evidence Derived from the Acta of the Lateran Council of 649


Whether Maximus the Confessor knew of Augustine is a question of long standing uncertainty. In this paper, new evidence in the matter is presented through Maximus’ knowledge of the acta of the Lateran Council of 649. His later use of the acta reveals that he considered Augustine as one of the fathers of the Church whose teaching disproved monothelitism. In addition, following Rudolf Riedinger’s plausible thesis that Maximus is the author of the Lateran acta, a significant connection occurs through the acta’s use of two Augustinian texts from the fifth book of Contra Julianum opus imperfectum. These are woven into the argument in one of the acta’s final speeches, attributed to Maximus of Aquileia. The way these texts are cited and commented on clearly discloses the author’s familiarity with the extended context of the passages. This paper investigates the reason why this Augustinian work was particularly helpful in refuting one of the core ideas of monothelitism—the idea that everything natural is forced by necessity and that the will, if natural, consequently would lack genuine volition—an idea that was also held by Julian of Aeclanum. The paper also demonstrates Maximus the Confessor’s use of the structure of Augustine’s argument at other occasions and presents an argument for Maximus’ authorship of Maximus of Aquileia’s speech.

Valerie Karras - "No Woman in the Resurrection": The Gender Eschatology of John Chrysostom


Origen, the Cappadocians, and Maximus the Confessor are well-known for their views that sexual differentiation is ontologically insignificant in their theological anthropology and that they propose its abolition in the resurrection body.  What is less discussed, however, is that even the most prominent Antiochene Father, John Chrysostom, held a similar view.  This is particularly striking given the Antiochenes’ more literal, less Platonic and less allegorical approach to biblical interpretation, particularly in the creation accounts of Genesis.  Discerning Chrysostom’s views on the nature of sex and gender, both in terms of God’s eternal plan and in his eschatological anthropology, is also more difficult since he has no expansive and detailed discussions of these along the lines of, e.g., Gregory of Nyssa’s De hominis opificio.  Nevertheless, by carefully reading some of Chrysostom’s sermons as well as key passages in his De virginitate, it is possible to glean something of the Antiochene Father’s views of the provisional and economic nature of human sexual differentiation, including his belief that in eschatological humanity “there will be no woman.”

Andrew Louth - Symbolism and the Angels


Dionysios the Areopagite develops an elaborate doctrine of like and unlike symbolism mostly in connexion with his teaching on the celestial beings (‘angels’, though for Dionysios ‘angel’ is the title of the lowest rank of the celestial beings).  This paper will explore the background of his theory of symbolism in Neoplatonism, especially in Proklos, and outline its development in St Maximos the Confessor.

Joshua Lollar - The Contemplation of Nature in Maximus the Confessor's Ambigua to John


This paper gives an analysis of the theme of “natural contemplation” or “natural philosophy” in Maximus the Confessor’s Ambigua to John. It begins with a brief overview of the contents of the Ambigua, showing the centrality of the notion of knowledge of the created world in Maximus’ vision of the transgression of Adam, the economy of salvation, and the relation of the different aspects of philosophy: ethics/praxis, natural contemplation, and theology. It then focuses specifically on three themes from the Origenist controversy of previous generations—the fall of intellects from a primordial henad, the supposed intellectualism (at the expense of concerted ascetical practice) of the Origenist monks, and the notion of the world as the place of judgment of fallen intellects—showing how Maximus addresses these issues especially in the opening chapters of the Ambigua, chapters 6-8 and 10, and the last chapter, 71. I show how Ambigua 6-8 interpret Gregory Nazianzen’s statements from his oration On the Love of the Poor regarding the human condition in a way that establishes the fundamental condition of human passibility and thus sets the stage for his description of the nature of philosophy in Ambiguum 10. Here I demonstrate how Maximus argues for the inseparability of praxis and contemplation, arguing, in fact, that reason and contemplation (logos and theôria) “contain” praxis within themselves. Finally, I show how Maximus appropriates Origen’s notion of the world as judgment and training ground to his own understanding of the world as the image of divine reality. Here the contemplation of nature is regarded by Maximus as a “game” the Word plays with us in order to lead us on to knowledge of the divine. The paper thus contributes to our understanding of what Maximus takes to be the nature of true philosophy and presents a nuanced reading of Maximus’ relationship to Origenism.

Torstein Theodor Tollefsen - The Metaphysics of Maximus: Becoming One With God


Maximus the Confessor makes some rather strong claims about deification. He speaks for instance of becoming God, ‘being made God by God’ (Amb. 7, 1084a). However, Maximus’ radical notion of divine transcendence makes it impossible for any created being to be transformed into the divine essence as such: we achieve completely whatever God is, but not at the level of essence (cf. Amb. 41, 1308b). Even so Maximus works out concepts of ontological conditions that make a realistic doctrine of deification possible. This paper investigates the logic and ontology of Maximus’ doctrine of becoming one with God.

Michael Bakker - Willing in Maximos the Confessor: Rational Desire and Intelligent Worship


St. Maximos the Confessor defines human willing as ‘rational desire’ (orexis logikê). In his Letter to Marinus and the Disputation with Pyrrhus, he describes, rather technically, the stages of a particular act of will from willing to use via, amongst others, enquiry, deliberation and choice. Before embarking on a motion through these stages, a crucial question needs to be answered: “Is this desire rational, i.e. in accordance with the principle of human nature?” 

In St John Damascene, Andrew Louth discusses John’s rendering of the Maximian teaching on the will. He provides an answer to the above question by quoting Iris Murdoch: “’Freedom is not strictly exercise of the will, but rather the experience of accurate vision which, when this becomes appropriate, occasions action’. From this point of view, deliberation is what we fall back on when our vision is clouded or confused: it is a measure of our lack of freedom, not the signal exercise of freedom. (…) The bridge between ascetic and dogmatic theology is explicit; for John’s discussion of Christ’s willing in On the Orthodox Faith is part of his presentation of human psychology, which, as we have argued, serves an essentially ascetic purpose.”

This paper explores another possible bridge: towards the Confessor’s mystagogical theology. It is suggested in his (mystagogical) commentary on the Lord’s Prayer, where, in the context of “Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven”, he remarks that God demands from human beings intelligent worship (logikê latreia).

Tuesday, 12 July 2011

Brian Gronewoller - Augustine’s Use of Felicianus of Musti in His Argumentation Against the Donatists


This paper explores Augustine of Hippo’s use of the Donatist’s forced re-absorption of Felicianus of Musti and his Maximianist followers to create both a conceptual microcosm against and a critique of Donatism. Since Augustine’s ‘epistulae’ often shed light on larger, more academically exhausted texts, the scope of this paper is limited to those ‘epistulae’ that were written both to and concerning the Donatists. 

Although two broad themes can be found in Augustine’s use of Felicianus, space limitations guide the paper to more exhaustively study his arguments and critiques concerning baptism as a demonstration that there is a parallel depth in those arguments and critiques concerning the Church. The paper argues that Augustine uses the example of the Maximianist schism and re-absorption of Felicianus and his followers into the Donatist Church in order to critique their position by considering the implications that exist whether Felicianus had administered either a “true” or a “false” baptism during the separation. Having explored these, Augustine demonstrates the hypocrisy in their position of rebaptizing converts from the catholic Church since they did not rebaptize those who received the sacrament during the Maximianist schism. In this way, he argues, they have accepted the baptism of a small schismatic group while ignoring that of the entire world.

Augustine also uses the example of Felicianus to further his own theologies concerning baptism – specifically that the baptism of Christ is made effective because of Christ and not because of the purity of the person administering the sacrament, that baptism’s efficacy is directly tied to the right use of that baptism by the initiate, and that rebaptism is a horrible offense to the baptism of Christ. 

Explored in his ‘epistulae’, the use of Felicianus of Musti as a vehicle to transport Augustine’s arguments against the Donatists is found to be a significant rhetorical tool in the developing debate between the two parties.

Saturday, 9 July 2011

Marius Portaru - Gradual Participation according to St Maximus the Confessor


Modern scholars have interpreted Maximus the Confessor's conception of participation in God in different ways, emphasising his Neoplatonic background, or his strictly Christian substitution with a theory of deification, or, finally, his cosmological dimension. The aim of this paper is to outline that a synthesis of all these components is possible by resorting to a diverse method of interpretation, which takes into account both the philosophical Neoplatonic frame and the Christian anthropological assumptions of Maximus’ vision.
A closer analysis of his vocabulary, limited not only to the traditional philosophical Greek terms for participation, is coroborated with observing the transposition of the Ps.- Dionysian participation through hierarchy into the “territory” of every single human being’s experience of God. In Maximus’ neo-Areopagitic and neo-Cappadocian understanding, the hierarchy of communicating the divine light, as appears in Dionysius, is transformed into a progressive knowledge of God by the soul. Admittedly, this could explain why Maximus does not take any serious advantage of the vision of a celestial and ecclesiastical hierarchy. God is the Being and every other perfection in every creature. He is all in all, wholly present to every human being and infinitely above all, yet his theophany through creation is different from deification, for the latter one is regulated by the human free will and love. In this interpretation, the role of the logoi of creatures in participation is limited and the Christological component depends very much on how the purpose of the Incarnation is conceived.

Thursday, 7 July 2011

Luis Granados Garcia - The Role of the Holy Spirit in Christ, according to Saint Maximus the Confessor


Recently rediscovered, the thought of st. Maximus the Confessor has already shown his richness in several areas of research. Specially fruitful has been his position regarding the two wills of Christ and his obedience to the Father at the Garden of the Olives. Maximus is decisive in the controversy against monothelism and against new ways of nestorianism. His position shows the mystery of Christ without reducing his humanity and without dividing him in two persons.
In this research we will try to see the connections of Maximus dithelism in other areas of his theology. Which is the relationship between his explanation on the human will of Christ and the work of the Holy Spirit in Him?

Due to the focus of the studies on Maximus’ Christology, his Pneumatology has been overlooked. The role of the Spirit in Maximus’ thought was studied by Loosen in 1941 (Pneuma und Logos), but we do not find further studies on this topic. The interest of Maximus’ Pneumatology has been reduced to the problem of the ‘filioque’. 

This study follows the mysteries of the life of Christ, trying to discover the role of the Spirit in them. This path is related to the dynamism of every human being from the image of God to the likeness. The work of the Spirit in the human activity and will of Christ is respectful with their rythms. According to the Confessor, the Spirit is present in the Incarnation through his “synergy”, in Baptism, through his filial adoption, and later generating his virtues and bringing him towards the obedience (the concord, harmony) to the Father.

In this way, the role of the Holy Spirit in Christ helps us to understand the path of Christ’s freedom and human will towards the Pascal Mystery.

David Bradshaw - St. Maximus on the Will


Whereas classical Greek thought had tended to analyze human decision-making in terms of two distinct faculties, those of boulesis (rational wish) and prohairesis (choice), Maximus sees these as simply modes of the more fundamental faculty of natural will (thelesis).  In thus introducing thelesis as a master-faculty governing voluntary action, Maximus takes a significant step in the direction already taken by Latin thought in its use of the concept of voluntas (will).  This paper will seek to understand Maximus’s reasons for taking this step and the extent to which his concept of will is similar to that of Latin thinkers such as Augustine.

Tuesday, 5 July 2011

Andreas Andreopoulos - "All in all" and the Eschatological Mystagogy of Maximos the Confessor


One of the strangest problems in the study of the Liturgy of St John Chrysostom is the meaning of the phrase “kata panta kai dia panta” (for all and in all) in the anaphora. Although this phrase (which could be read in several ways) is in the most significant and most theologically charged part of the Divine Liturgy, it has not been interpreted in any of the medieval and Patristic liturgical commentaries. The most systematic and detailed among them, the Commentary on the Divine Liturgy written by Nicholas Cavasilas, simply repeats the phrase, not venturing an interpretation – although it discusses extensively almost every other part of the service. This lack of interpretive foundation in the Fathers exacerbates the problem, since the phrase is grammatically ambivalent to begin with. Modern liturgical scholars (such as Robert Taft) generally connect it with the recount of the historical work of Christ, but although this is possible, there is no Patristic support for it. In addition, in my opinion, the current mainstream interpretation is somewhat limited in its theological view.
A different possibility is offered by a careful reading of the Mystagogy of St Maximos the Confessor. His analysis of the Divine Liturgy omits the anaphora (various explanations have been given for this), yet between his comments on the Sabbaoth Hymn and the Lord’s Prayer (the parts before and after the anaphora) include a strangely off-the-topic relatively lengthy reference to St Paul’s  eschatological “o theos panta en pasin” (God will be all in all) (1 Cor 15:28). Although St Paul’s phrase is grammatically different, the similarity of the two phrases is striking.
My short introduction to the problem will try to present the possibility of a different reading of the liturgical phrase, which is more consistent with the eschatological liturgical view of St Maximos. According to this reading, although St Maximos does not directly engage with the meaning of the anaphora in his Mystagogy, enough indirect clues may be found in the 24th chapter of the Mystagogy and elsewhere, to suggest that his interpretation of the liturgical phrase was not the same as the current modern interpretation, but offers instead a much more strongly eschatological reading of the anaphora and the entire Divine Liturgy.

Demetrios Bathrellos - The Patristic Tradition on the Sinlessness of Jesus


In the last couple of centuries many theologians have argued that Jesus Christ bore a fallen, sinful human nature. Some of them (for instance, Karl Barth) recognized that this is at odds with patristic teaching. Others however (such as T.F. Torrance and T. Weinandy) maintained that many Fathers of the Church also believed that Christ's human nature was fallen. This paper will attempt to give a succint presentation of the relevant views of some of the most distinguished Fathers of the Church, including Gregory of Nyssa, Cyril of Alexandria, Maximus the Confessor, and John of Damascus, as well as the teachings of Chalcedon and Constantinople II. From this, it will be concluded that the evidence strongly suggests that the standard view found in the patristic tradition on this matter is that the humanity of Christ was not sinful. By presenting the teachings of select Fathers of the Church, the paper will also show why these Fathers believed that the humanity of Christ was sinless and furthermore had to be sinless to be sinless, and, by implication, why the view of modern theologians who maintain the opposite view is theologically unsustainable. 

Adam Cooper - Freedom and Heteronomy: Maximus and the Question of Moral Creativity


It is characteristic of human action and definitive of its self-determination and liberty that it somehow realise the novelty and creativity proper to its created, deiform nature and to the dynamic scope of historic and personal contingency. Yet the morality of human action can also be and, in Catholic Christianity, continue to be, measured and appraised by its relative conformity to the stable norms of reason, nature and the divine will. At first these two approaches, the first representing what one might call a morality of freedom and the second a morality of heteronomy, seem to be at odds. Moreover, they leave unanswered the question of the relation of human action to Christ, its efficacious redeemer and ultimate if unspecified goal. This paper briefly explores Maximus’s contribution to this challenging complex of thoughts, paying special attention to three main themes in his writings: a) his anthropological distinction between the creative exercise of freedom (pôs thelein / thelêsis) and its ontological foundation (haplôs thelein / boulêsis); b) his understanding of the dynamic drama of human passion and desire, deliberation and action; and c) his theological exegesis of the suffering Christ’s obedience to the will of his Father.