This paper reflects on the term dektikê dynamis in Ambiguum 20, Migne PG 91: 1237B, by Maximus the Confessor. The study begins with a survey of the previous use of dektikos, and moves to a discussion of this text’s use of dektikê dynamis in contrast with other uses in Maximus.
Recognizing Aristotle as a starting point, I discuss two major senses of dektikos. One of these we find in logico-metaphysical contexts, where the term is used of a predicative subject / metaphysical substance; and the other in intentional contexts such as appetite, sensation, or thinking, and used of a rational subject. I also mention here the term’s relation to two other concepts: to the categories of active and passive, as well as to logical possibility. From here, a sketch of the term’s use, with special attention to Patristics, with special interest in known influences on Maximus, and recogninzing other uses, such as in moral and mystical contexts.
After introducing Amb. 20, 1237B and considering it on its own terms, I make comparison and contrast between this use, which uses a final paradigm of deification, and other important uses of dektikê dynamis in Maximus, namely, in Quaestio ad Thalassium 22, which is largely efficient causality, and Quaestio 59, on prophetic revelation, which seems to use an intentional paradigm, both from roughly the same period as Amb. 20.
From this, I conclude 1.) that Maximus’ dektikê dynamis, while tangential to Neoplatonic terms such as epitedeiotes, is largely Peripatetic in context, [yet consistent with Neoplatonic Commentators]; 2.) that the term’s sense in 1237B has some active sense, and should not be reduced to an exclusively passive sense; 3.) that Maximus’ concept of dektikê dynamis, and specifically that concerning theôsis, is not limited to efficient causality, and 4.) that Maximus’ paradigm of deification is influenced by models of intentional action.
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