Vincent DeVendra: Inquiry as Impulse in Augustine's De Trinitate

This paper provides an interpretation of Augustine’s discussion of inquiry problems in De Trinitate based on his acceptance of the Stoic definition of inquiry as an “impulse for finding out” (appetitus inveniendi).  In Book VIII, Augustine presents a paradox: One must love God in order to come to know him, and yet no one can love what one does not know.  It seems, then, that God can neither be loved nor known.  This same principle could be applied to any object of inquiry: Unless one loves some potential object of inquiry, i.e., recognizes the worth of that object enough to seek it, the inquiry can never begin.  And, yet, how can one love what is unknown? To solve the paradox, Augustine must show how something that is in a sense unknown may be loved so that knowledge of it may be sought. 

While there has been some discussion of Augustine’s problem of inquiry, it has previously been assumed that his point of departure is Plato’s presentation of the paradox of inquiry in the Meno.  However, this paper will show that Augustine’s most influential source is Cicero’s Prior Academica, from which he takes his definition of inquiry presented in Book X nearly verbatim.  The definition, given by Lucullus, is Stoic, and Augustine’s approach to inquiry shares certain assumptions of Stoic psychology which are implied in that definition.  For the Stoics, an impulse is necessary for action, but any impulse must have certain conditions met before it can take place.  Therefore, the failure to meet these conditions results in apraxia, a state of inaction.  Augustine’s presentation and discussion of the problem of inquiry is an attempt to explain how the conditions for the particular impulse that is inquiry to occur are satisfied, and is therefore primarily psychological in nature.