Jonathan H. Young: The Resurrection of the Rational Soul and Origen’s Modification of Metensomatosis

Scholars argue that Origen of Alexandria conceives the soul’s spiritual progress within a modified Platonic paradigm (Marx-Wolf; Ramelli). Others suggest more alignment with the New Testament (Edwards). According to Ramelli, Origen advances that the soul occupies an earthly, human body only once (ensomatosis), rather than a cycle of multiple bodies (metensomatosis). This notwithstanding, Marx-Wolf argues that the soul, separated from the body, still is capable of spiritual advancement. Furthermore, Origen insists that the Christian teaching of the resurrection should contrast with metensomatosis (Con.Cels. 5.29, 3.75). Origen’s Contra Celsum and De Principiis belie full disavowal of metensomatosis. He harmonizes Plato’s “cycle of generation” (Phaedrus 249Aff) with the Christian teaching of the soul’s resurrection (cf. 1 Corinthians 15). Like Plato, Origen preserves the souls’ future embodiment (cf. Phaedrus 247b-c). One obtains this spiritual body at its resurrection in heaven, not on earth (Con.Cels. 7.32, 7.44). Implicit in Origen’s disagreement with multiple earthly incarnations, is the suggestion that the human soul is born into animals or vice versa (e.g. Plato, Phaedo 81d-82b, Phaedrus 249b). Origen solves this conundrum by incorporating the Stoic distinction of rational, human soul and the irrational, animal soul (cf. Gilhus; cf. Con.Cels. 7.17, 8.18). Thus, I argue that Origen preserves the paradigm of metensomatosis but limits its scope to only earthly, human body. The soul’s future embodiment occurs at its heavenly resurrection and not in another human lifetime. This study provides a window into third-century CE debates among Platonists regarding the interpretation of Plato’s teachings.