Amanda Knight: Augustine's two lights in vision and divine illumination

  A consensus interpretation of Augustine’s theory of the divine illumination of the mind has yet to be reached. While scholars like Schützinger and Nash argue that Augustine considers illumination to impart content (the eternal ideas) to the mind, others insist that illumination only secures conditions – like certainty in judgment (Gilson, Gioia) or the ability to abstract (Schumacher) – by which the mind formulates knowledge. I will show how Augustine’s theory of vision offers a schema for interpreting his understanding of illumination which best supports Nash’s interpretation.  I will argue that the two sources of light in Augustine’s theory of vision (the light of the eye and daylight) correspond to his two epistemological lights – the light of the mind and divine light. Just as the eye’s light is too weak to see anything without daylight, the light of the mind requires divine light for knowledge. Within this schema, Augustine conceives of two modes of knowledge. The mind that is turned away from (though still touched by) divine light apprehends objects dimly by its own light – like the knowledge by which an unjust person may rightly praise justice. The mind that is turned toward the divine light apprehends objects clearly by catching glimpses of that light itself. This figurative schema implies continuity between God’s mind/manner of knowing and the human mind/manner of knowing and thus supports Nash’s interpretation in which the human mind, patterned after the divine mind, contains imprints of the eternal ideas.